Eric S. Maskin

Nobel Prize Laureate in Economics, 2007

Adams University Professor at Harvard.


Eric S. Maskin is probably best known for his work on the theory of mechanism design for which he shared the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics. He has made contributions to many other areas of economics as well, including the theory of income inequality, the study of intellectual property rights and political economy. Eric Maskin is the Adams University Professor at Harvard. He has made contributions to game theory, contract theory, social choice theory, political economy, and other areas of economics.

“Nobel laureate recognized for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory”


Harvard educated Eric S. Maskin was the Louis Berkman Professor of Economics. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Econometric Society, and the European Economic Association, and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. He was president of the Econometric Society in 2003. He has worked in diverse areas of economic theory, such as game theory, the economics of incentives and contract theory. Eric S.Maskin was a designer of the British Government’s carbon dioxide emissions auction and was asked in the early 1990s to give advice to the Bank of Italy on possible reforms in their system of auctioning treasury bonds. He has also served as editor of The Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economics Letters.

Eric S. Maskin’s work in economic theory has had a deep influence on many areas of economics, political science, and law. A vast literature on implementation, influenced by Maskin’s groundbreaking work, has since evolved. His dedication is extraordinary, lauded for his clarity, teaching skills and ability to make complex maths problems understandable. One thing that really distinguishes him is how precise and careful he is.

A frequent speaker at international symposia, Eric S. Maskin’s presentations show one of the great minds in action, leaving his audiences inspired to tackle even the most difficult of questions.

Economic Theory

Political Economy

Mechanism Design

Income Inequality

Theory of Voting / Comparing Different Voting Systems

Theory of Coalition Formation

Theory of Repeated Games

The Pros and Cons of Intellectual Property Rights


Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence.
In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal--given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.


Planning, Shortage, and Transformation: Essays in Honor of János Kornai

The three major themes of János Kornai's work reflected in the title of this book--planning, shortage, and transition, or transformation--figure prominently in the essays. After a philosophical introduction by Edmond Malinvaud, the book is divided into three sections: Markets and Organizations, Theory of Transition, and The Transitional Experience.János Kornai is one of the world's leading experts on the economics of socialism and transition. An early advocate of reform in Hungary, he has written penetrating analyses of centrally planned economies and their transformation to market-oriented systems. This volume is being published in celebration of Kornai's seventieth birthday

Planning, Shortage, and Transformation: Essays in Honor of János Kornai